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In the United States, over the past half
century, we have lived under the protective
umbrella of vaccination programs that shield our
population from a dozen serious and sometimes
fatal naturally transmitted illnesses. Vaccina-
tion has been the single most cost-effective public
health intervention. However, the value of
vaccines in protecting the population against the
deliberate release of infectious organisms is not
so clear-cut.
The U.S. armed forces have recognized the
military value of vaccines against biological
threats and have a long-standing research and
development program for a series of vaccines to
protect service members from hostile use of a
biological agent. Vaccination against anthrax is
under way in all three armed services. The
Department of Defense has a large program to
develop and license additional vaccines for
biological defense. For the military, vaccination
is an effective means of countering a known
threat because the population at risk is easily
defined and a high level of vaccine coverage can
be achieved.
In evaluating the role of vaccines for
protecting the civilian population, quite different
answers are reached. Despite the protective
efficacy of vaccines against individual organ-
isms, the very high costs and the great
difficulties involved in vaccinating large popula-
tions, along with the broad spectrum of potential
agents, make it impossible to use vaccines to
protect the general population against
bioterrorism. Thus, vaccines cannot be consid-
ered a first line of defense against bioterrorism
for the general population, as they can be for the
relatively small military population. However, if
suitable vaccines can be made available, they
have several potential uses: control of a smallpox
epidemic and prevention of a global pandemic,
postexposure prophylaxis against anthrax (with
antibiotics), and preexposure prophylaxis in
first-responders at high risk, laboratory work-
ers, and health-care providers.
Smallpox and anthrax, which pose the
greatest risk for causing large numbers of
casualties in the event of an effective release by a
terrorist group, are at the top of the list of threat
agents. Licensed vaccines against both anthrax
and smallpox that protect against aerosol
transmission are available. An existing licensed
plague vaccine is protective against flea-
transmitted disease but not against aerosol
challenge in animal experiments or against
pneumonic plague. This vaccine is in limited
supply, and the manufacturer has recently
ceased production.
The Department of Defense Joint Vaccine
Acquisition Program has several experimental
vaccines in development (Table). These vaccines
will be further developed and tested with the
intent of obtaining products licensed by the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration.
Smallpox
One vaccine in development that is of great
importance to civilian biodefense is the vaccinia
virus vaccine made in cell culture. A new
national stockpile of vaccinia vaccine is urgently
needed to respond to the possible threat of a
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Table. Vaccines against biological agents
Licensed Vaccines in research
vaccines    and development
Anthrax Vaccinia (cell culture)
Smallpox (vaccinia) Botulinum toxoids
Plague Tularemia
Q fever
VEE, EEE, WEE
VEE, Venezuelan equine encephalitis; EEE, Eastern equine
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deliberate release of smallpox virus. Even
though such release is unlikely, the conse-
quences of being unprepared would be a global
catastrophe. An unchecked epidemic in todays
unvaccinated, densely packed urban populations
linked by rapid air travel could kill millions. The
only possible course of action would be to mount
a global effort to control the spread and eradicate
the disease using vaccinia virus vaccine. The
number of deaths due to secondary and
subsequent spread of this highly contagious
virus would be determined by the rapidity of the
public health response, the effectiveness of a
vaccination campaign, and, most importantly,
the availability of vaccine.
The national stockpile (fewer than 7 million
doses of vaccinia virus vaccine) is insufficient to
meet national and international needs in this
scenario. The stockpile is also deteriorating and
has a finite life span. The vaccine was made
using the traditional method of scarifying and
infecting the flanks and bellies of calves and
harvesting the infected lymph. No manufacturer
exists today with the capability to manufacture
calf lymph vaccine by the traditional method.
Replacing the stockpile will require the
development and licensure of a new vaccine
using modern cell-culture methods. This
development program, which will include process
development, validation of a new manufacturing
process, and extensive clinical testing, will be
expensive and may take several years (1).
Obstacles to the development of the vaccine
include the lack of satisfactory stocks of vaccinia
immune globulin necessary for managing
complications of vaccination. Clinical testing
cannot proceed without a supply of vaccinia
immune globulin. As part of the development
effort, the problems associated with manufac-
ture of sufficient quantities of vaccinia immune
globulin will have to be addressed and solved.
The Department of Defense program is moving
ahead with development of a cell-culture vaccine
by using a cloned strain of vaccinia derived from
another strain. Both civilian and military
requirements could be met by a combined and
expanded development effort using either the
cloned strain or one of the licensed vaccinia
strains. The development costs will undoubtedly
be high, as for any new biologic product, but the
cost of preparedness is insignificant when
weighed against the costs of an unchecked
smallpox epidemic.
Anthrax
Anthrax is the second threat that requires a
major research and development effort to meet
civilian needs. A covert attack, which exposes an
urban population to an anthrax spore aerosol, is
thought by some to be the most likely scenario for
a bioterrorism attack. If the release is detected or
the first cases are rapidly diagnosed, rapid action
can save many lives. Providing the exposed
population with antibiotics followed by vaccina-
tion could be lifesaving for exposed persons who
would otherwise become ill with untreatable
inhalation anthrax in the subsequent few weeks.
Prophylactic antibiotics alone will prevent
disease in persons exposed to antibiotic-
susceptible organisms, but incorporating vacci-
nation into the treatment regime can greatly
reduce the length of treatment with antibiotics.
Without vaccination, antibiotics must be
continued for 60 days; if effective vaccination can
be provided, this can be reduced to 30 days.
Vaccination of persons affected by an attack will
also face the issue of environmental contamina-
tion of urban areas after an attack. Stockpiling a
vaccine capable of inducing protective immunity
with two doses could be extremely valuable in
reducing the impact of a terrorist release of
anthrax.
The current anthrax vaccine manufactured
by Bioport (formerly the Michigan Department
of Public Health Laboratory) is an alum-
adsorbed, partially purified culture filtrate of
Bacillus anthracis with a high protective
antigen content. The schedule for administra-
tion is 0, 2, and 4 weeks and 6, 12, and 18 months.
This vaccine is safe and efficacious and is being
used by the armed forces to protect personnel
against the use of anthrax as a weapon.
Immunization of rhesus monkeys followed by a
high-dose aerosol challenge has convincingly
demonstrated the capability of this vaccine to
protect against aerosol challenge with B.
anthracis spores. The multiple dose require-
ment, however, is a drawback for civilian use.
Studies in progress may find ways to allow
modification of the schedule. Vaccine supply is
limited, as is production capacity. As a result, at
least for the immediate future, the armed forces
will require the entire available supply. This
vaccine is made by a method developed before the
advent of molecular biology and requires
dedicated facilities because B. anthracis is a
spore-forming organism. In addition to having a533 Vol. 5, No. 4, JulyAugust 1999 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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multiple-dose requirement, the vaccine is not
highly purified and contains multiple extraneous
proteins. The characteristics of the vaccine and
the constraints on the present method of
manufacturing argue strongly against procuring
large amounts for civilian use when the
technology and the science base exist to rapidly
develop a second-generation, improved anthrax
vaccine.
Anthrax depends on two toxins (lethal factor
and edema factor) for virulence. A protein called
protective factor is an essential component of
both toxins. The protective factor content is the
basis for the effectiveness of the current vaccine.
A vaccine based on purified protective factor
made by recombinant technology has been
protective in animals (2). Use of a modern
adjuvant with purified recombinant protective
factor should make it possible to have a very
effective two-dose vaccine. A recent report of the
Institute of Medicine Committee on Research
and Development to Improve Civilian Medical
Response to Chemical and Biological Terrorism
makes a strong case for a major research and
development effort leading to an improved
second-generation vaccine (1).
Questions regarding the ability of existing
anthrax vaccines to protect against anthrax
strains engineered to contain additional viru-
lence genes have been raised in Russia (3).
Research is needed to address this and related
questions about the pathogenesis of anthrax and
protective immunity.
The value of vaccinating law-enforcement
and emergency response personnel, who must
respond to threats (real or otherwise), depends
on the nature of their work and the immediacy of
the threat. Laboratory personnel who must work
with unknown materials and with high
concentrations of known infectious materials
must be vaccinated. These are additional
justifications for moving ahead with a vigorous
development program for anthrax and smallpox
vaccines.
Dr. Russell is professor, Center for Immunization
Research, Johns Hopkins School of Public Health; former
Commander, United States Army Medical Research and
Development Command.
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